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]ekyll Is and Hyde Isn't: Negotiating
the Nationalization of Identity in
The Mystery Garden and ^Breakfast at Tiffany's77

Sebastian Hsien-Kao Liao
The Dream of a Transparent Society
It often has been argued that the ending of Orphan of Asia
(Yaxiya de gu}er) by Wu Zhuoliu (1977) is arbitrary because the
tension between Hu Darning's need for a firm sense of belonging
and his disappointment with the “motherland” experience he has
had in Mainland China remains unresolved. Therefore, the fact
that the novel ends with Hu returning to China to join the
Chinese in fighting against the invading Japanese seems a bit
forced to many. In real life, however, this might not have
sounded so arbitrary if there had been no civil war to politically
separate Taiwan from Mainland China. Sutured both by the
traditional (Han) Chinese cultural identity and the identity
provided by a stable modern Chinese nation state, the
Taiwanese could very well have fe lt secure. And the
“Hudamingian” confusion would have become just a curious but
transient historical phenomenon with few consequences. But
the civil war changed everything.
This is not to say that an identity problem had never
surfaced in China before. But the one that is currently harrowing
Taiwanese society assumes a “new” type of modality in the
Chinese cultural consciousness, one that had its precedent in
the May Fourth Movement.1 That is, it pertains to the nation
state. Thus, to cope with this problem, new approaches have to1
1

亞細亞的孤兒
吳濁流胡大明

Prior to the Republican era, “identity disputes,” if they could be

so called, usually centered round whether or not a given regime was
the legitimate heir of the Daotong [the tradition of the Way]. In other
words, it was at most a problem of the elite class, and the question was
always this: Who among all the “Chinese contenders of legitimacy”
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be configured on the basis of an understanding of the demands
on identity imposed by the nation state. The commonsensical
way of dealing with this problem is to ascribe it to the fact that
Taiwan does not have a clearly defined national identity. If this
were the case, then, it would naturally follow that a clear
definition of this national identity would be an apt solution to the
problem.
But before we accept this argument, let us first pose the
following questions: What is a nation state? What kind of
legitimacy does it have in the contemporary world? Why has
national identity, as it pertains to the nation state, become such
an urgent issue in Taiwan as well as elsewhere? And finally, can
a stable national identity actually be achieved and, if so, for what
purpose and at whose expense?
First of all, it should be re-emphasized that even the most
private kind of identity has always been a discursive
construction. This is all the more so for the “national identity” of
a modern nation state, a historical product in itself. Therefore,
national identity has never originated deep within human nature
but is produced by the discourse on the nation state. This
means that, when we talk about the issue of identity, we have to
historicize it. As Stuart Hall puts it, “[precisely because
identities are constructed within, not outside, discourse, we need
to understand them as produced in specific historical and
institutional sites within specific discursive formations and
practices, by specific enunciative strategies" (Hall 1996: 4).
The method for acquiring (national) identity was not the
same before the rise of the nation state as it is today; it changes
as time goes by.2 As a result, to historicize the issue, we will
need to ask the following questions: Why does national identity
actually had the “right identity”？ Since the Republican era, however,
the contestation has increasingly turned into a problem for the general
populace. More on this in note 2.
2
When Gellner discusses “high culture，
” he makes an insightful
comparison between pre-modern and modern identity formations.
According to him, the essential difference between the two resides in
the fact that identity formation on the basis of the possession of “high
culture” was the exclusive right of a small elite. Even though it
appeared authoritative to the rest of the population, it could rtot be
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come to present itself before us in its current manner? That is,
why have we taken for granted, first, that national identity is of
primary importance in an individual’s identity formation, and，
second, that it has to be stable and “transparent”
？
Both of these two issues have to be understood in light of
what gave birth to the nation state—the capitalist system.
Analyzing the relationship between capitalism and the nation
state, Marx points out that capitalism entails “the abstraction of
the political state." Since the latter is a corollary of the capitalist
system, it also is based on what is fundamental to that system,
the division of labor. Being an abstraction as well as a product
of the principle of the division of labor, the political state would
inevitably “demand” that its citizens’ subjectivity or identity be
implicated in the process of abstraction and division—that is,
one that is produced by alienation in the first place (Marx 1843:
81).
According to Marx, the modern subject was bom from the
nation state: the impact of capitalism on medieval society and its
political and economic systems not only generated the political
state (i.e_，nation state) but simultaneously “liberated” the
“individual” （
1846: 72)_ However, since this liberation of the
individual means distributing citizenship among all its subjects,
^citizenship" no longer implies any special status as in the pre
modern period, but becomes an abstract identity. In other
words，the modern notion of the “individual,” in excluding private
life, denotes only the individual in the public sphere and
therefore in its abstract form. This explains why the public and
private spheres became separated in the modern nation state
(1846: 75).
llThis [abstract] man is," Marx continues, (<the basis, the
imposed on them. Industrial societies popularized this high culture and
forged a discourse that had to be practiced by everyone in the society
(Gellner 1983: 50-51). The passage from the Ottoman Empire to the
Turkish Republic fully illustrates this transformation: the empire had a
very loose kind of id e n tity fo rm a tio n . Som e even co n sid e r it
cosmopolitan. But ever since modern Turkey began its so-called
“reform” based on the model of the nation state，it has adopted an
identity policy so severe and inflexible that few authoritarian countries
can rival it (Robin 1996; 69).
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precondition, of the political state" (1846: 77). In this system, (ta
person’s distinct activity and distinct situation in life were
reduced to a merely individual significance," and ltthe political
function became the individual’s genera/ function” （1843: 166;
emphasis mine). In other words, even though the individual was
born together with the modern nation state, l<it is only through the
state that individualism is possible" (Durkheim 1957: 64; qtd.
Sayer 1991: 80). Defined and rendered abstract by the nation
state, such a subject—one devoid of inner life—is what Marx
calls the “modern subject■”
By now there is little doubt that the birth of this modern
subject is closely tied to the logic of capitalism. The nation state
transformed its subjects into abstract and empty “political men”
or “juridical men,” with a view toward ensuring “market freedom”
through the ''orderly oppression of law" (Sayer 1991: 83, 73).
Such “orderly oppression of law，
” according to Sayer, represents
an attempt on the part of the nation state to suppress the private
part of the individual in order to become a viable production unit
that can best serve the interests of the capitalist system.
In order to be productive, the nation state has to do more
than implement an "orderly oppression of law"; it also utilizes a
more subtle kind of domination so that its subjects can be made
to do things for it of their own accord. For instance, market
freedom “rests upon a much more comprehensive moral
regulation of social relations and identities, through a plethora of
agencies for the reformation of character” （
Corrigan and Sayer
1985; Corrigan 1990; qtd. Sayer 1991: 73). The sort of abstract
individualism created is also a kind of “moral individualism”
(Sayer 1991: 80). It not only prevents the individual from
indulging in “e g o ism , but exacts unprecedented “moral”
demands on the individual (more on this later).
More importantly, what seems to be the state's domination
is in fact also class domination.3 The institution of the modern
nation state, itself deeply rooted in capitalism, is in fact a
burgerliche gesellschaft formed by the bourgeoisie for its own
benefit; this class created, and therefore is most at home in, the
capitalist system. Consequently, the political typology of the
3
More often than not, bourgeois domination of the nation state
involves domination with respect to gender, race and age (Sayer 1991:
85-86).
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nation state and its class nature are two sides of the same coin,
while the above-mentioned “abstract man” is bound to be a
“class individual” (Sayer 1991: 69). Nevertheless, “it is precisely
because the bourgeoisie rules as a class that in the law it must
give itself a general expression" (Marx 1846: 329); that is to say,
it (lmust assert itself in its external relations as nationality and
internally must organize itself as state1' (1846: 89; emphasis
mine). As a result, within a nation state, the subjectivity as
manifested by the ruling bourgeoisie becomes the common
subjectivity of everyone through the use of state apparatuses.
That is why the bourgeoisie could proclaim that "the nation state
itself becomes the embodiment of the 'society' and the new
basis of the individuals1 public identities." Since it “claims to
embrace all,” it follows that it also “claims the lives and loyalties
of all” （
Sayer 1991:75-76).
Thus far, we have come to a preliminary understanding of
the sym biotic relationship between the nation state and
capitalism, as well as the fact that the nation state is in fact
dominated by the bourgeoisie. But then, how does the
bourgeoisie ensure its domination? Or, to put it another way,
how does it make the subjects feel that the “national identity”
that it provides is necessarily their primary identity? Ernest
Gellner’s analysis of nationalism argues strongly that it is
through nationalism and its corollary, what we mentioned earlier
as “moral individualism,” that it does so.
According to Gellner, the identity offered by the nation
state is rooted in nationalism, which in turn is based on a certain
division of labor; it is a new type of “culture” bom from “industrial
GellneM983: 24). The purpose of this “culture” is to
society” （
satisfy the demands of an industrial society because this society
is “the only society ever to live on sustained and perpetual
growth” （
1983: 22). In order to keep pace with its great
economic growth, it can no longer function according to the strict
hierarchical social system typical of an “agrarian society”
；it has
to achieve a certain degree of mobility and egalitarianism,
characteristics that would facilitate the supply of labor which is
“instrumental, optional，and renewable” （
1983: 24-25). To
ensure this, an industrial society must provide its citizens with a
universal education which is “generic and standardized,”
enabling them not only to become highly mobile and re
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trainable，but to “communicate” and “exchange meaning” with
ease (1983: 27-35).
Nationalism is central to the production of this kind of
labor. That is why Gellner argues that, “contrary to popular and
even scholarly belief, nationalism does not have any very deep
roots in the human psyche” but instead is coterminous with “a
kind of now pervasive social order" (1983: 34). Gellner calls this
social order "universal high culture," literate and trainingsustained, as opposed to the "folk culture" of agrarian societies:
of these two cultures, the latter is transmitted orally and the
former is sustained through universal education and the mass
media. Universal high culture thus replaced “king，land，or
religious faith” as the new object of loyalty for the “modem man.”
The fact that Adam Smith calls the nation state the “Mortall God”
while Weber calls it the ^nation-church-state" underscores this
point.4 Obviously “allegiance to culture” is synonymous with
“allegiance to the nation state，
’’ and “high culture” is closely tied
to, and shaped by, the nation state (1983: 36-38). This is where
the power of the nation state lies: through high culture, it
repeatedly claims to be able to “represent essential components
of individual identities, to epitomize who we are" (Corrigan and
Sayer 1985; qtd. Sayer 1991: 82).
The real, or at least the major, intent of nationalism has
been all but laid bare: in order to maintain perpetual growth, an
industrial society manufactures high culture and the members of
the society ((breathe, live and produce in i f (emphasis mine)
(Gellner 1983: 37-38). In a word, the nation state disseminates
nationalism through “culture”—
— in fact we can even say that the
cultural intent of a nation state is to disseminate nationalism—
and its subjects are made to accept the national identity supplied
by the bourgeoisie as their primary identity. This is tantamount
to a collective unconscious which can secure the bourgeois
domination of the nation state and, consequently, perpetual
growth. W hile, with his oft-quoted theory of “imagined
communities," Anderson indeed goes further than Gellner in his
4
In traditional societies, an allegiance to culture was not
uncommon. But since high culture was usually transmitted through
narrow channels and to a rather small group of elites, only the elites
would pledge strong allegiance.
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analysis of how the nation state manufactures ^culture/'
especially with regard to “print capitalism,” he does so in a
basically phenomenological manner and ignores the crucial
relationship, as outlined above, between the nation state and
capitalism (Anderson 1991).
To understand how the bourgeoisie-dominated nation state
ensures that its subjects succumb to the beckoning of
nationalism and then willingly pledge loyalty and help maintain
constant economic production, we need to refer to Foucault’s
discussion of “go vernm entality.” It is by im plem enting
“governmentality” that the nation state is able to monitor its
subjects down to the smallest detail and make sure they will fulfil
the demands nationalism imposes on them. According to
Foucault, before modernity came into existence, the civic-legal
(i.e., public) and spiritual (i.e., private) spheres of Western
society were governed, respectively, by politics and religion. But
since the sixteenth century, the modern government—or nation
state一of Western society began to merge the “city game” and
the “shepherd game” and form a “secular political pastorate” or
“police state，
’’ turning “individualization” and “totalization” into
two sides of the same coin. Such a government claims to be ltof
all and of each" (Burchell et al. 1991: 8-12). At first glance, it
seems that it does so because it believes it can take better care
of the people by "[enabling] every subject to have an
‘economically’ useful life” （
1991: 12), but in fact it aims more to
expand the power of state apparatuses. While the separation of
the public and private spheres by the bourgeoisie-dominated
nation state does not necessarily have only negative
consequences，the “police state” was nevertheless definitely
moving in the direction of minimizing and even eliminating the
private sphere of the individual.
The police state not only instituted surveillance over the
"conduct" of its subjects, but also unrelentingly encouraged them
to live an “economically useful life.” This then developed into the
mentality of “panopticon,” seeking perfect, one hundred percent
control (Burchell
al. 1991: 25). This is what Foucault means
when he speaks of the dream of a transparent society created
through "techniques of surveillance, a pastoral concern with the
capacities of a population, and the force of public opinion”
(Donald 1996: 181). In such a society, the subjects become
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servants to the state: they have to be ready to sacrifice
themselves for the state. Even though capitalism eventually
forsook the covert project of complete “statization” or state
control, it nevertheless delegates power to private institutions
which disseminate power through less conspicuous means
(such as popular culture) and are often able to actually conceal
or naturalize the fact of domination (Burchell et al. 1991: 25-27).
This is what Baudrillard refers to as “simulacrum,” the form of
seamless cultural control in late capitalist society. Theoretically,
the main difference between modem identity and pre-modern
identity is that the hereditary nature of the latter has been
transformed into the free choice of the former. But, in fact, in a
nation state-dominated modern world, people living in a given
society have little choice in their adoption of a national identity,
since the concept of citizenship seems to stipulate that, while
one is apparently allowed to choose, one must always make 1(the
right choice" (Zizek 1989: 165-66).
The foregoing discussion has revealed that the severe
demand of the nation state—that national identity be primary
and transparent—is a product of specific historical conditions
involving the domination of capitalism and the bourgeoisie. The
nation state does not have enough legitimacy to make such a
demand, nor can it fully disguise the fact that, in actuality, this is
a system of domination. To put it in more radical terms, it does
not have absolute universality. Even though Gellner has pointed
out that the nation state is an institution that arose in response to
an industrial society’s demand for “perpetual growth,” it does not
necessarily follow that any society that plans to industrialize has
to incorporate this institution in a wholesale manner.
During the encounter of cultures, it often was the case that
the industrialized West，considering itself “more civilized，
’’ forced
its institution of the nation state upon non-Western, traditional
societies by means of its superior weaponry (Appadurai 1996:
141-42). At the same time, the non-Western societies were also
goaded into believing that, for the sole reason of technological
backwardness, they were obliged to abandon their traditional
values altogether and eventually enter the trap of “[dying]
precisely in the manner the West wants it to die” （
Gourgouris
1996: 61). But in fact the grand wish on the part of these
societies to be reborn through the institution of the nation state

Jekyll Is and Hyde Isn't

73

was not fulfilled, because of the destruction of their traditions;
this is a fact that unwittingly exposed the defects of the
institution (Robins 1996). Certainly, the advent of the age of
globalization also has permitted us a better understanding of the
symbiotic relationship between the ^national longing" and the
“consumerist aesthetics” of capitalism, that is，the hyperreal
nature of the nation state (Luke 1995: 94).
In view of the fact that the nation state will be here to stay
for quite a while, how are we to make the most of a deeper
understanding of this institution so as to minimize its negative
effects, such as capitalist exploitation, class domination,
communal conflicts, and gender and age discrimination? In fact,
the answer is very simple. It is imperative that we de-prioritize
and de-transparentize national identity.
The actual
implementation of these two measures requires a complete
grasp of the expediency of both the “form” and “content” （
in the
Zizekian sense) of the identity provided by the nation state. The
fact that the foregoing genealogical study of identity formation in
the nation state has excavated the historicity of its "form" should
be evidence strong enough to exert a de-mythifying effect on the
assumption that the longing for a national identity is rooted in
human nature，and hence to de-prioritize such an identity. But
the "content" of national identity, which, being totemized, has led
to the desire for its transparency, awaits further interrogation.
The work of llde-transparentization>, must proceed from the
recognition of the subject as “void” or “empty.” But this implies
an awareness of the subject's radical emptiness instead of a
practice of actually emptying it out, an awareness that any
content of an identity derives from discursive constructions and
hence is historically situated, changing with time. On the other
hand, it should also be recognized that this subject is also
“constitutively antagonistic” or “lacking” （
乏i之
ek 1989: 124-27) and
therefore does not have an a priori unity. This is as true with
individual subjects as with the subject of a democratic institution.
Nevertheless, understanding the subject as having no fix(at)ed
or unified content exemplifies only the passive meaning of the
notion of “subject as void.” Its positive meaning can be seen in
the fact that only through the notion of an abstract subject
located in the symbolic order can we recognize, in the light of
the Law, the injustice of all the various kinds of “imaginary
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identifications" occupying the collective subject positions. Only
on the basis of this recognition can we protect our own interests
and ensure our right to become a unique individual, to the same
extent that others have protected and ensured theirs (Donald
1996: 175). This is the only path to radical democracy.5
But to resist the hegemony of Imaginary identifications'1by
means of the voidness of the subject is not tantamount to saying
that in daily life, we are to discard our “emotions” （
what 乏i2ek
after Lacan, calls jouissance). Identity formation necessarily
involves both “emotional attachments” and “practical concerns”
which are inextricably intertwined (Smith 1997; 66-69; Liao
Hsien-hao 1995; Appardurai 1996). Moreover, our daily practice
actually relies on the filling in of the void of our subjectivity.
Without the emotional part, the subject would not even exist,
since this part is the positive condition of the void subject: “by
losing the material support, the very form dissolves itself (Zizek
1991: 165); demanding absolute rationality would in the end
produce the monster of the “pure subject of Enlightenment”
(Zizek 1992: 134-36). That explains why Lacan insists on the
importance of the concept of sinthome: the part of us that is not
accountable by rationality is in fact "the only support of beingJ,
(Zizek 1989: 75).6 Therefore, the "voidness of the subject" does
not imply that the subject works in emptiness; it underscores an
awareness of the expediency of the content of all subjectivities.
However, since the accretion of emotions is the only way in
which the subject expresses its subjectivity, it can understand
the dialectical relationship between past and future from the
5 Superficially, Zizek's blank subject seems no different from the
abstract bourgeois subject. In fact, as its bourgeois origin makes clear,
the “abstract” citizen，far itom being “blank，
” always already has
assumed a class content, which in turn is accompanied by other
content elements such as gender, race, ethnicity and age.
6 My prolonged debate with Chaoyang Liao centered round the
issue of whether the void or blank could allow for the existence of
emotions. Chaoyang Liao’s argum ent was supposedly based on
乏 i之ek’s adaptation of the Lacanian conception of subjectivity as void.
But in fact what he tried to defend was transparency rather than
voidness. See Liao Chaoyang (1995a; 1995b; 1995c; 1996a; 1996b)
and Liao Hsien-hao (1995a; 1995b; 1996a; 1996b).
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conflict between rationality and emotion. At the same time, the
subject can learn to respect others’ emotions (Donald 1996:
188). All communities and individuals could (and could only) fill
in the voidness with their own emotional accretions; they should
by no means be prevented from doing so. According to Donald,
“[one’s] enactments of citizenship embody the different ways of
experiencing the impossibility of identity" (Donald 1996: 186).7
One word of caution, though. The fact that Zizek links
“emotion” with “nation” might mislead us into thinking that
“emotion” takes a singular rather than plural form. If that were
the case, then "nation" would not be the support of identity but
its “content,” because the subject of “nation” （
that is, citizenship)
would no longer remain “empty•” How then would it be different
from the usual form of nationalism, which always acknowledges
only one kind of emotion for the nation as legitim ate?之i之
ek’s
concept of “nation，
” defined as the Lacanian Das Ding，that is, “a
traumatic real object fixing our desire" (Zizek 1991:162), in fact
refers to the impossible enjoyment of the nation state, one that
cannot be crystallized into a coherent object and thus remains
beyond the organization of the symbolic but also supports this
same organization. In other words, since a state by nature
contains more than one community and should be ready to
accept as valid all the different emotional matrices these
communities employ to support their citizenship, the praxis of
citizenship inevitably produces differences. In this light,
according to Donald，even Habermas’s notion of a “posttraditional” cultural identity remains still on the level of “content”
and does not meet the criterion of real, democratic thinking
about identity (Donald 1996: 173-75).
But a nation state demands transparency of identity
precisely because it does not admit that its subjects have
emotions (or jouissance). In other words, nationalism's ultimate
desire is to absolutize or essentialize the content which it has
filled in the empty citizenship. Put in a different way, it
7
We need to communicate and negotiate precisely because our
emotions are directed toward different objects. Or, in Zizek's words,
we have our own enjoyment. The purpose of communication and
negotiation resides in advising the parties involved to give up the
impulse to completely fill in one's emotions in the empty subject.
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legitimizes or “Jekyllizes” the emotions of only a part of the
people of the state. The consequence of this is bound to be that
emotions of other kinds will be depreciated or suppressed and,
having no legitimate outlets, will eventually reappear in the form
of the “return of the repressed,” what Donald calls the “Hyde”
phenomenon (Donald 1996: 188). Zizek is even more direct: "All
attempts to fill out democracy with ‘concrete contents’ succumb
sooner or later to the totalitarian temptation, however sincere
their motives may be" (Zizek 1991: 163-64). Lacan goes even
further in imagining the worst case scenario: "I love you, but
there is in you something more than you, objet petit a, which is
why I mutilate you” （
Lacan 1978: 263)_
But the above-m entioned exclusionary "prim ordial
sentiments” that characterize nationalism do not belong only to
“backward” or “uncivilized” communities (such as tribal peoples
or underdeveloped non-Western societies). Despite their
apparent spontaneity, emotions are “acquired” through learning
(Appadurai 1996: 147). The “primordial sentiments” said to
permeate primitive societies are even more obviously llclose to
the center of the project of modern nation state" (Appadurai
1996: 146). In other words, the nation state is more of a
manufacturer of these kinds of sentiments than so-called
primitive societies: it makes use of state apparatuses and the
media (especially the latter) to consistently chum out “emotions”
and seduce its subjects into identifying with them and
internalizing them. The purpose of doing so is nothing other
than to “suppress internal dissent, to construct homogeneous
subjects of the state, and to maximize the surveillance and
control of the diverse populations under their control” （
Appadurai
1996: 146). Communal conflicts occur often because largescale identities), have been "convincingly portrayed as primary
(indeed even as primordial) loyalties by politicians, religious
leaders, and the media" (emphasis mine). The consequence is
that ordinary people would 1(self-fulfillingly seem to act as if only
this kind of identity mattered and as if they were surrounded by a
world of pretenders” （
1996: 155). This is what Appadurai
postulates as the “treachery hypothesis，
” which describes an
untrusting attitude toward the “aliens” living next door，one that
eventually may lead to a “sense of betraya l” since the
“transparency” of one’s identity investment is ultim ately
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impossible. History has made it clear that if this "sense of
betrayal" is relentlessly aggravated by politicians, it would not be
long before these “aliens” are “slaughtered” because there are
always any number of ways ready at hand for the “natives” to
prove that these “aliens” have that “something in them more
than them" (1996: 154).
The foregoing discussion has amply demonstrated how
imperative it is that we “de-primarize” and “de-transparentize”
the identity offered by the institution of the nation state. Then,
the so-called identity problem troubling Taiwanese society will no
longer be “What kind of nation is Taiwan?” （
Does Taiwan have
an unclear national status?), but llWhat kind of nation (society)
do the Taiwanese want?” （
Do we consent to the “primarization”
and Htransparentization" of national identity in our neglect of the
problems of corporate exploitation, organized crime, communal
conflicts, class domination, gender domination, and so on?) If
we insist on pursuing the dream of a “transparent society”
conceived by the nation state, it will be difficult to measure how
much our social capital would be squandered. On the other
hand, only by imagining a kind of “open nation”一one that allows
us to have a genuine “multicultural society”一and by interpreting
and re-inventing Taiwan more creatively can we dissipate the
imagined urgency of the identity problem (Liao Hsien-hao 1999)
and shake off the nationalist shackles on cultural development
that this problem imposes.

The Abdication of the Mistress of the Estate:
Woman and National Identity
There is no dearth of modern Taiwanese fictional works
that deal with the issue of identity. Despite this obsession with
national identity, however, reflections on the nature of the nation
state as a discourse have been seriously lacking. Most of them
cannot find an alternative to falling back on the notion of the
"nation state" as a "final solution." It is as if the longing for a
nation state is innate in human nature rather than the product of
a mode of production. While there have been debates over
national identity, as well as its nature as a product of discourse,
those who participated in the debates (whether they be in favor
or against, left wing or right wing) have only been engaged in

78

迷園李昂
第凡内早餐
朱天心

朱影虹

林西庚

Sebastian Hsien-hao Liao

relatively crude affirmations or denunciations of the nation state,
failing to offer a historicized critique of the nation state as a
discourse.8 Fortunately, in the last few years some works seem
to have offered some incipient possibilities.
In the following discussion, I will employ two fictional
works— The Mystery Garden (Mi yuan, 1991), a novel by Li Ang,
and "Breakfast at Tiffany's" (Difan}nei zaocan, 1997), a short
story by Zhu Tianxin—to illustrate this new development in
critical thinking on national identity in contemporary fictional
writing. What is worth noting is that, although the two works
presumably come from opposing camps, they seem to agree
with each other in many ways. And it is in the convergence of
their thinking that we can most likely see hope for the future of
Taiwanese society.
Li Ang's The Mystery Garden has two parallel plots: one
concerns the sexual desire of Zhu Yinghong, the daughter of a
rich family in Lugang, one of the oldest townships in Taiwan; the
other concerns her father, who sustained political persecution by
the KMT and died with his dreams unfulfilled. The relationship
between these two plots has been the focus of much critical
discussion. Some critics believe that the two lines of
development remain unintegrated (Jin 1993; Huang 1993). A
major reason for this argument is that the author's political
position—Li Ang is known to be a fervent supporter of Taiwan
independence—seems to be contradicted by her sympathy for
repressed female sexual desire (Huang 1993). Indeed, one of
the emphases of this novel is on the issue of national identity. Li
Ang’s anti-Chinese political stance also leaves little room for
doubt as to her political allegiance. 丫et the author’s feminist
position is just as central to the novel. Hence, what remains to
be done is to devise some way of bridging the two positions.
The two lines of development concern Zhu Yinghong’s
respective relations with the two most important men in her life:
her father and her lover Lin Xigeng. These two lines run parallel
to each other, one concerning the sad failure of a (Taiwanese)
nationalist attempt to build a nation state and the other a story of
unrequited love. But in fact, they often refer to each other and
8
In my debate with Chaoyang Liao, this was one of the major
points I was trying to illustrate, which to my knowledge had never been
put forward before in Taiwan.
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are m utually im plicated, as we can easily tell from the
juxtaposition of the two men whenever they are placed in similar
situations. Zhu’s father and Lin Xigeng share some important
qualities. Even Zhu’s love-at-first-sight experience with Lin could
be understood as triggered by Zhu's discovering, or, more
precisely, imagining to have discovered, qualities that her father
lacks, or could have had but were prematurely repressed by
political persecution.
In fact，Zhu Yinghong’s choice of a lover is influenced by
her father in two opposing respects: she looks for someone who
is similar to her father yet complements him in significant ways.
Having learned from her father that he had had great and noble
ambitions, which were left unfulfilled due to political persecution,
causing him to idle away his life in Han Garden, Zhu vows to
realize her father’s dream. For her, this means marrying
someone who has the ability to complete the unfinished task her
father started. At first sight, Lin does seem to meet her
requirements. In his handsome looks and the patriarchal
(masculine) authority that he exudes, he is like her father. Once
the connection between the two men is unveiled, it is quite
obvious that the relationship between Zhu and Lin is more than
just an erotic one. It reads more like an allegory about the
political status of "Taiwan." The question is: What precisely is its
allegorical meaning?
We have to begin by exploring the allegorical meaning of
the relationship between Zhu Yinghong and her father. The
latter at first plans to build a high school for the purpose of
inculcating in the Taiwanese people enlightened, modern
knowledge. But after the political persecution of the KMT, a
Chinese (and thus, for him, a non-Taiwanese) regime, he comes
to believe in the necessity of “constructing” a “native culture,”
even though he fears the opportune moment has passed him by.
From his personal history, we learn that his cultural-nationalist
dream is rooted in a worship of Enlightenment thinking not
uncommon in his time, which has as its ultimate realization the
establishment of a nation state. When political reality makes it
impossible for this dream to be actualized, Zhu's father turns to
Han Garden as a surrogate locale where he can comfort himself
with a miniaturized, imaginary nation state.
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Although Z h u’s father is far from strict and
uncompromising_ in a way that one may be tempted to picture
traditional Chinese fathers—his relationship with his daughter is
nevertheless built upon a code of obedience (“[she was] always
taught to obey her father unconditionally" [Li 1991: 147]).
Therefore, although Zhu Yinghong has taken it upon herself to
carry on her father’s unfinished attempt to construct a dignified
identity related to the creation of a nation state for the
Taiwanese, she is nevertheless constrained by the traditional
(both Chinese and Japanese) as well as bourgeois roles of a
woman (“[I was] bom at the end of last century” [1991: 18]),
which require her to be deferential and discreet in the presence
of men. In sexual terms, she has always been trained, and feels
compelled, to desire a masculine man, someone who could help
complete her father's incomplete project.
Judging from Lin Xigeng’s looks, he does satisfy the terms
that Zhu Yinghong—or rather, nationalism—has set up for the
national father: he is tall and handsome, ambitious and full of
energy, authoritarian and entrepreneurial. All these combine to
create an image of the founding father of a nation state. To a
great extent, too, he is actually representative of the age he lives
in, when Taiwan was beginning to make its presence felt in the
international business arena and building its foundation as an
independent nation state. Besides, marriage between a man
like Lin, who is from the countryside of Taiwan, vibrant and
energetic, and a woman like Zhu, the well-educated and
beautiful daughter of a rich and established family from a
culturally sophisticated old city in Taiwan, is keenly reminiscent
of the prototype of the founding marriage of all nationalist myths.
There seems to be no reason for a Taiwanese not to shower it
with blessings.
But Li Ang has seen through the fog of the nationalist myth
(one espoused by both nationalist camps: the pre-Li Denghui
KMT and the present ruling party, DPP) and hit it in its most
vulnerable spot. The two occasions, on which Zhu Yinghong
first unleashes her libidinal energy on Lin and then falls
helplessly in love with him, are described as taking place in
kitschy singing salons where businessmen strike their business
deals. Presumably for a well-educated woman like Zhu, these
are not the best venues in which to fall in love. In particular, Zhu
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becomes immersed in the virtual reality conjured up by the
sentimental pop songs and becomes helplessly infatuated with
Lin. Such melodramatic falling in love is not something that
happens to Zhu alone.9 But the fact that her “love” for Lin is
spurred on by pop songs fully underscores the way in which her
erotic desire has been m anipulated by the hyperreality
fabricated by the media and technology of the capitalist system.
The fact that the author purposely arranges for the rendezvous
which seals their love to take place on a plot of land where Lin is
going to build a housing complex lends further support to such a
reading. At the point when she is totally aroused by Lin’s
caresses, Zhu raises her head in anticipation of full
consummation of their love, only to find him ^indifferent and
without desire” （
1991: 183). Obviously he is doing it not out of
“re a llo ve ，
” but merely by the book. Everything about their
relationship turns out to have been executed within the circuit of
a bourgeois discourse of love a la Taiwanese.
In other words, the foregoing incident virtually epitomizes
how the capitalist principle of commodification has always
already reduced “sacred love” （
if it ever existed) to a vulgar myth
of love. More importantly, insofar as love is an allegory for
nation-building in this book, the above revelation about love has
also exposed the “sacred” content of nationalism to be the
material desires of capitalism, which is intent on ravaging the
land of Taiwan. Not only is Zhu Yinghong here made a symbol
of the land being ravished, but elsewhere in this story the land
itself is also compared to a supple woman waiting to be ravished
(see 1991: 229). Thus, the institution of the nation state is
nothing but an extended claw of global capitalism reaching deep
into the private areas of Taiwan. Only on such a premise can
the erotic relationship between Lin and Zhu be construed as one
between the colonizer and the colonized. And only through this
perspective can we grasp the theme of this book.10
9 P ro u sfs Remebrance o f Things Past and Kundera's The
Unbearable Lightness o f Being, for example, are among the most
outstanding literary works in which love is described as having arisen
from the workings of the imagination.
10 Xiaoyan Peng has interpreted the erotic relationship between
Zhu Yinghong and Lin Xigeng as “colonial.” However, unless we
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While Zhu Yinghong is still entrapped in the bourgeois love
discourse, she hopes she can be married to Lin in a
conventional way, live an honest marital life, and eventually have
kids. During this period, she is almost completely her father’s
(that is, nationalism’s) girl，doing everything in her father’s name
and for her father's sake. But despite the power of patriarchal
discourse as aided by capitalist commodification, her female
perspective enables her to m aintain an excess of
consciousness, which eludes co-optation by the patriarchal traps
set up by the bourgeois love discourse. She knows deep down
that she doesn't really want to accept the role assigned to her
under the bourgeois value system: “There’s still a crystalline and
sober me that hides somewhere in me which says clearly and
irrefutably: This is definitely what I want to do” （
1991: 283).
This is the voice that comes out of her deeper self even as
she, being pregnant, is waiting for a firm er and clearer
commitment from Lin. Upon hearing this voice, Zhu makes up
her mind to be freed from the influences of hyperreality—the
discourses of love and of the nation state in which her “love” for
Lin originated—influences of which she is not unaware but which
have been exerted upon her ever since she fell in love with Lin.
She has an abortion. While she used to think that the perfect
combination of Lin's untamed vitality and her refined upbringing
would result in the birth of a new Taiwanese, one who would be
the new master of Han Garden, she eventually realizes that
everything about their love affair so far has been closely tailored
to fit what Baudrillard calls the ^models" of capitalism. The way
she captures Lin is but an old-fashioned man-hunt game of a
patriarchal society and one which involves no “re a llo v e .”
Therefore their baby pulsates with no real life.
Only after Zhu has had the abortion does she affirm her
status as an independent woman. The necessity of taking this
understand the word “colonial” in terms of the complicitous relationship
between the nation state and capitalism , it makes little sense to
interpret the actions of a Taiwanese who “strives to establish the
national dignity of the Taiwanese” as an attempt at “colonizing” another
Taiwanese. The prevailing practice in Taiwan and elsewhere of
describing the relations of domination between classes and sexes as
“colonial” confuses rather than clarifies. See Liao (1999).
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step not only signifies an implacable conflict between an
independent female subjectivity and the male-dominated
institution of the nation state, but also seems to imply that there
is some kind of fatalistic contradiction inherent in Taiwanese
cultural nationalism—that is, a contradiction between Zhu Feng
(the ancestor of the Zhu family which symbolizes the legacy of
sea pirates or economical adventurousness) and Madame Chen
(the wife of Zhu Feng who represents the impulse toward
cultural consolidation). Looking at Taiwan from the perspective
of this novel, this indeed seems to be the case. Zhu Yinghong
and Lin Xigeng seem to be contemporary incarnations of these
two mythic ancestors of Han Garden/ Taiwan. The seafaring
pirate and the hom e-loving Madame had a ferocious
confrontation three hundred years ago and this conflict is not
mitigated a bit in our time; if anything, it has worsened. This is,
however, a fact which few Taiwanese nationalists notice, except
Li Ang.
In order to rescue Han Garden, Zhu’s first vision is to try to
marry Lin. But the fact that no offspring comes from their
marriage signals the futility of her project. Lin’s vitality now has
been completely emptied out by capitalism, as he admits when
speaking about his virility: “I’m no longer as good as before”
(1991: 183). Worse still, he has become nothing but a
henchman of capitalism. As a result, their marriage has
ironically created a fatal threat to Han Garden, which eventually
leads to Zhu’s decision to donate it:
uWhat would happen to this garden if one day I'm deprived of the
title of Mrs. L in ..
He obviously understood what she meant, but chose to
ignore it: “Perhaps I would tear down everything and build an
apartment complex on it if the price is good?" (Li 310)

It seems as if they were talking about the possibility of their
marriage running aground one day. But ironically, by changing
his subject, Lin hits right on target. With or without a divorce,
Han Garden is doomed now that one of Lin’s feet is inside the
door; Lin can enter the garden any time he wants, whether he is
Zhu’s husband or ex-husband.
At first sight, the symbolic meaning of Han Garden seems
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rather clear: it is symbolizes Taiwan. But how it does so merits
closer examination. Vis-a-vis Lin the henchman, it symbolizes
the land (connoting nature); at the same time, though, it is also a
cultural project. Having adopted the three hundred-year-old
legacy of Madame Chen, Han Garden represents an effort to
take root. The thing is, this effort has not even succeeded at as
recent a time as that of Zhu's father. On the other hand, since
this effort to take root is a cultural project, it is also constantly
under the threat of “nature”
；any slight negligence might allow
wild nature in the garden to swallow up everything humanistic.
This is why this peasant boy is chosen by Zhu because Han
Garden as a cultural project needs someone who knows the soil
and has more vitality.
But, to her dismay, Lin is still the pirate who appeared
three hundred years ago; he is both ignorant about culture and
lacks the stamina of a cultural hero. All he is interested in is
pillaging and p lu n d e rin g .巳ecause he is a pirate, he is so
compatible with the capitalist spirit that he himself becomes a
threat to the cultural project. That is why Zhu decides to let the
curse of Madame Chen on the Zhu family be fulfilled: “the Zhu’s
fam ily line will be extinguished and the garden donated”
because Zhu would rather do that than let Lin ravage the garden
through land speculation. In other words, in order not to let the
bourgeois institution of the nation state exploit the garden in the
name of the “nation，
” Li Ang would rather bring to an end the
project of nation-building, which Zhu's father had held to be his
life-long goal.
But we are not saying that Li Ang is therefore no longer
attached to Han Garden. Her feelings for the garden are fully
revealed in the last scene where Zhu looks back at the garden
and sees an illusory vision of the garden in flames. But she is
fully aware that her father’s project of modernization/ nativization
(i.e., lighting up the garden with fluorescent lights; archiving the
garden with German-made cameras) has always already turned
the garden into a fetish in the capitalist system. Nevertheless,
this does not have to mean the end of the garden. Donating the
garden may eventually prove to be a turning point, since it will
be in the hands of the “people” now and no longer tied to the
project of the state. Thus, donating the garden signifies a strong
desire to escape from further commodification as well as the
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potential for one to become a tool for the nation state. Even
though Zhu is strongly attached to the land, she is not obliged to
embrace the male-dominated, bourgeois institution of the nation
state: "Therefore I want this garden to belong to Taiwan, to its
population of tw enty m illion and not to any oppressive
government” （
1991: 306-7). Han Garden may still stand a
chance, but whatever ideals it signifies do not necessarily have
to—they had better not, according to the book—be realized
through the nation state.

The Revenge of the Female Slave:
The “New Human Being” and National Identity
Whereas The Mystery Garden depicts the alienation of an
old-fashioned Taiwanese from the (Taiwanese) nationalist
establishment, “Breakfast at Tiffany’s” looks at how a “new
human being" (xinrenlei) resists the bourgeois nation state. The
story depicts a young woman who has read widely in social
theories by people like Marx and participated in radical social
movements. But she wallows, too, in the dream of buying a
diamond for herself. In allowing this dream to unfold itself, she
examines, with evident irony, how bourgeois society incessantly
exploits “the people”一and how social movements and cultural
criticism indirectly aggravate this exploitation. More ironically,
buying a diamond has somehow become the means whereby
she derives her hard-won independence as a subject.
At first sight, this story looks like a direct indictment of
society, but when the female protagonist’s attempt to purchase a
diamond is introduced and made the central plot line of the story,
it begins to exude some kind of "uncanny" flavor. On the one
hand, she consistently interlaces the narrative with all manner of
leftwing discourses. This indicates that she is highly aware of
modern man’s “universal dependency” on institutions when he
lives in a capitalist society (Sayer 1991: 61). But, on the other
hand, she obviously seems to have deviated from the ideals she
held very dearly as a student activist. In being absorbed in the
project of buying a diamond to satisfy an unknown desire in
herself, she seems to have to tally succumbed to the
consumerist aesthetic of capitalism.
Such apparently contradictory perspectives, however,
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come to co-exist in the protagonist for a reason. In fact, the
leftwing discourses have not at all lost their explanatory power
for her. On the contrary, her newly found passion for
consumerism is brought about by the powerful insights which
these discourses have proffered her and which the society at
large is doing everything it can to downplay. Precisely because
she has thoroughly embraced these radical ideas, she can
question what her fellow radical activists (including her ex-boy
friend Xiao Ma) have done, for they have mostly abandoned
their former beliefs and are now devoting most of their energy to
the nationalist cause instead. As nationalism is, by definition,
bourgeois nationalism, it would not come as a surprise if these
social activists-turned-nationalists now hold an abstract rather
than a concrete idea of “the people,” one inherent in the trinity of
the bourgeoisie, capitalism and the nation state. In other words,
since the Taiwanese “democratic movement,” which has come to
be totally dominated by the Taiwanese nationalists, has
consistently espoused as its ultimate goal the establishment of a
new nation state, and has now been steeped in the consumerist
aesthetic of capitalism, it is difficult for its supporters to conceive
of the people as heterogeneous (Zhu 1997: 92). As a result,
issues not immediately conducive to the nationalist cause such
as gender, race, and class are conspicuously absent from their
discourses about the nation state. Class, in particular, is
banished to the farthest margins f I don’t know why Xiao Ma,
who wanted to be always in the dissident camp, no longer talks
about class problem s” [1997: 107]). This is why Marx
emphasizes that "the nation attains existence as a notion, a
fantasy, an illusion, a representation—as the represented nation
. . . cut off from the real nation” （
Marx 1843: 69-70: qtd_ Sayer
1991: 75). Such an institution is but “a collective
misrepresentation of bourgeois society, whose real content
remains the inequities of capitalism" (Sayer 1991: 83).
At the same time, the institutions that are involved in either
maintaining or creating a nation state are constantly enlisting
every possible technique of governmentality to promote the
^primacy" of national identity and ensure an increasing degree of
“transparency. Any excess has to be clearly accounted for and
assimilated. This is why, according to the protagonist who is
also the narrator, even President Li Denghui “has asked the
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government institutions concerned to study the ‘new human
beings”’ （
1997: 87). The famous writer and activist A, whom she
interviews, also insists on clarifying <(how [she] identifies herself.
Is she Taiwanese? Chinese? Taiwanese as well as Chinese?
Chinese but living in Taiwan?” （
1997: 97)
The protagonist is aware that Taiwan’s political and social
movements—which bring the only hope of reform— have
completely lost their bearings in their obsession with nationalism
and ignored the worsening of the class situation in Taiwan (“We
have become hereditary slaves without our knowing i f [1997:
106]). Precisely because of this, she turns nihilistic. From her
perspective, the usual descriptions of the “new human beings”
(as “consumerist” or “nihilistic”）are wide of the mark. The long
list of their characteristics as put together by A is derived from
hearsay accounts. Zhu Tianxin believes, on the contrary, that
the real reason for the emergence of the “new human beings” is
the further entrenchment of capitalism in contemporary society.
Granted that postindustrial capitalism ’s much enhanced
capability to produce desire definitely affects the consuming
habits of the “new human beings,” their nihilistic tendencies
probably have much more to do with the uneven distribution of
wealth that they are confronted with after they graduate and
begin working in the real world. According to the protagonist, it
makes more sense to call them “new proletarians” or “new poor”
rather than “new human beings,’ which has an air of chic-ness.
Financially strapped, she is forced to become a “nomad”
roaming the illegally constructed shacks on rooftops (1997: 94)
and a “female slave” trapped in the professional world (1997:
89). Given a social environment that is hopelessly uncongenial
to reform, she can only seek her sense of security and belonging
in a diamond. In other words, the spendthrift habits of the “new
humans” in fact take shape ironically in response to their own
financial strappedness.
Keenly aware of her status as a slave, the protagonist
believes that she l,need[s] to possess a diamond in order to
regain freedom ” （
1997: 89). But why is she so keen on
possessing one since she obviously sees clearly that diamonds
are nothing but hard and bright stones? While one may argue
that the invincible brainwashing effects of the capitalist
consumerist aesthetic might have weakened her resistance to
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the desires it produces, there is more to her wish for possession
of the diamond. This could in fact be construed as an act of
resistance to capitalist commercial fetishism through fetishism.
The ability of diamonds to produce, with the help of light, a
dreamlike atmosphere which resembles so much the power of
capitalist dream-making is appropriated by her as a source of
self-empowerment. If the diamond cannot give her real
freedom, the effects it creates will at least make the small, bleak
room in the basement she has rented look warmer: llMy
Southern Star indeed brings an undescribable glamor to my
basement” （
1997: 108)_
Like The Mystery Garden, "Breakfast at Tiffany's" also
ends with the presentation of a fetish. Further, both fetishes
radiate floods of irresistible charm when placed under bright light
(a symbol of “modernity” or “modernization”). But in 77?e /WysteAy
Garden Zhu Yinghong in the end liberates the land" which is
increasingly being commodified, while in “Breakfast at Tiffany’s”
the protagonist brings home the fetish. To a certain extent, the
different strategies employed reflect class differences. But there
is one thing that the two works have in common: resistance
against the “nationalization” of identity. The Mystery Garden
returns the garden to the people in order to escape from the
pillaging and plundering of capitalism carried out via the
institution of the nation state. Seeing no way out, the
protagonist in “Breakfast at Tiffany’s” opts to embrace the
diamond like a moth darting undauntedly into a fire. But the
illusions Zhu Yinghong has of the garden when she looks back
wistfully at it—lit up by a huge number of fluorescent lights, so
that “in the dark night，the whole garden looks [as if it were]
engulfed in flames” （
1997: 312)—seems to imply that Taiwan's
further incorporation into late capitalism is ineluctable. In the
case of “Breakfast at Tiffany’s,” unless the protagonist is
equipped with the “double vision” of true postmodernity and the
Baudrillardian will power “to be seduced endlessly，
” her “Robin
Hood-ian revenge" (1997: 103) on capitalism remains within the
parameters of capitalism and is doomed to be futile.11 All things
11 Derrida's strategy of sous rature, through which we can cope
with our limited existence in language with a “double vision,” is often
invoked now when one talks about postmodernity. However, it is^ often

Jekyll Is and Hyde Isn’t

89

considered, we can nevertheless argue that the resistances of
both protagonists, predicated as they both are on a fatalistic
vision, locate them among the most radical as well as clear
sighted protests against the simulated trinity of the bourgeoisie,
capitalism and the nation state.
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